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T

his july in west virginia v. epa , the supreme court
formally recognized the “major questions doctrine.” That
doctrine, which can be traced to a 1986 law review article

published by then-Judge Stephen Breyer, calls on courts to consider a
legal question’s “political importance” when interpreting statutes.
The major questions doctrine is a product of legal pragmatism—a theory
of statutory interpretation advanced by Justice Breyer which often
elevates statutory purpose and consequences over text. The doctrine is
inconsistent with textualism—an interpretive theory that emphasizes
statutory text, structure, and history to understand a statute as the public
originally understood it. The takeaway is clear: textualists should reject
Justice Breyer’s major questions doctrine.
Justice Breyer’s Proposal
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In 1986, Stephen Breyer published what would arguably become his most
influential scholarly article to date. At the time, he was a federal judge on
the Boston-based United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and
he was already recognized as a leading administrative law scholar. The
article, “Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy,” addressed a
perennial issue in administrative law: when, if ever, should courts defer
to an administrative agency?
Breyer approached the question through the lens of legal pragmatism,
pursuant to which a judge considers a statute’s purpose and, with an eye
toward practical consequences, asks how a reasonable legislator would
pursue that purpose. More specifically, Breyer advocated for a specific
form

of

legal

pragmatism

that

promotes

“active

liberty”

by

“supplementing ordinary professional judicial approaches with increased
emphasis on the Constitution’s democratic objectives.”
Breyer exercised his unique form of legal pragmatism in the article,
proposing that a court should defer to an agency when doing so is what a
reasonable legislator would want. And because “Congress is more likely to
have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving
interstitial matters to answer themselves,” he concluded that courts
should not often conclude that an agency had been delegated the
authority to decide a question of “great importance.” Breyer would
maintain this view throughout his career, stating more recently that the
“hypothetical reasonable member of Congress” would want a court to
“not defer” to an agency’s decision when that decision answers “a
question of national importance.”
Supreme Court Buy-In
Breyer’s proposal gained traction at the Supreme Court. In 1994, the
Court ruled in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone &

Telegraph Co. that Congress would not have implicitly delegated to the
Federal Communications Commission the authority to answer a
telephone-regulation question of “enormous importance.” Six years later,
in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., a majority of the Court
cited Breyer’s 1986 article to rule that, if Congress had intended to
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delegate to the Food and Drug Administration the authority to regulate
tobacco—a major decision affecting “a significant portion of the American
economy”—then Congress would have delegated that authority more
clearly.
Despite the majority’s reliance on his article, Justice Breyer authored a
dissenting opinion in Brown & Williamson, and discussed the majority’s
application of his theory. Even if courts “should assume in close cases that
a decision with ‘enormous social consequences’… should be made by
democratically elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected
agency administrators,” Justice Breyer wrote, he did “not believe” that the
regulation of tobacco presented such a close case. That was because he did
“not believe that an administrative agency decision of this magnitude—
one that is important, conspicuous, and controversial—can escape the
kind of public scrutiny that is essential in any democracy.” And given that
public scrutiny would “take place whether it is the Congress or the
Executive Branch that makes the relevant decision,” he would have
permitted the agency to regulate tobacco.
Justice Breyer’s Brown & Williamson dissent elucidates one weakness in
the type of legal pragmatism he promotes: two judges with different
policy

views

might

weigh

non-textual

factors

such

as

political

“majorness” differently, thereby risking judicial decisions that appear
motivated by the judges’ differing policy views—such as whether and how
telephone or tobacco companies should be regulated.
By contrast, textualism provides a separation of legal and policy
considerations, which works to prevent unelected judges from making
decisions based on their own political beliefs. Today, a majority of
Supreme Court justices are self-described textualists. One might think,
then, that Breyer-esque considerations of political “majorness” would be
disfavored. One would be wrong.
In a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts in West Virginia

v. EPA, the Court announced that its earlier considerations of majorness
in MCI and Brown & Williamson were the workings of a full-fledged legal
doctrine. That doctrine, the “major questions doctrine,” closely tracks
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Breyer’s 1986 proposal: when determining whether an agency has the
statutory authority to regulate a particular matter, the major questions
doctrine calls on courts to consider whether the matter is of major
“economic and political significance.”
If it is, then the court must look for extra-clear statutory language before
concluding that Congress granted the agency the authority to regulate the
major issue. Relying on the statement of a single senator, who opined that
the statutory provision at issue in the case was “obscure,” the Court ruled
that Congress had not delegated clear enough authority to the
Environmental

Protection

Agency

to

enact

certain

power

plant

regulations.
Justice Breyer joined Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion in West Virginia,
which concluded that the major questions doctrine is inconsistent with
textualism. Justice Kagan’s claim is notable because the West Virginia
majority included several self-described textualists. But as I have written
on a few occasions, Justice Kagan is correct.
No doubt, the major questions doctrine might seem appealing to those
textualists concerned with reigning in the administrative state. But any
benefit obtained by invoking the doctrine (and its focus on political
calculations) to curtail agency action in a handful of one-off instances is
almost assuredly outweighed by the cost of undermining the textualist
enterprise (and its separation of legal and policy decisions) more
generally. Textualists concerned with reigning in the administrative state
ought to abandon the major questions doctrine and instead focus on
doctrines

consistent

with

textualism—such

as

the

nondelegation

doctrine, which limits Congress’s ability to delegate to unelected
regulators the power to set national policy, regardless of whether a judge
thinks that policy to be of “major” political importance. Consider three
reasons why the major questions doctrine, born of legal pragmatism, is
inconsistent with textualism.
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A textualist analysis of the relevant constitutional
provisions reveals that the major questions doctrine
undermines, rather than promotes, the Constitution’s
chosen means for promoting democracy.
Legislative Intent
First, consider the major question doctrine’s problematic focus on
legislative intent.
Unlike legal pragmatists—who interpret statutes through the eyes of the
hypothetical reasonable legislator—textualists interpret statutes from the
public’s perspective. Justice Barrett has described this distinction as one
between congressional “insiders” and “outsiders”: textualists “approach
language from the perspective of an ordinary English speaker—a
congressional

outsider,”

rather

than

“a

hypothetical

legislator—a

congressional insider.”
Because textualists approach text from the perspective of a congressional
outsider, Justice Barrett explained, “textualists have long objected to the
use of legislative history,” such as committee reports and floor speeches,
“on the ground that it is designed to uncover … legislative intent.” And
textualists reject such a focus on legislative intent because textualists
understand legislative intent as being both “nonexistent” (because
Congress’s 535 members have no single, shared intent) and “irrelevant”
(because even if a shared intent could be identified, it would represent
the view of congressional insiders).
Given that textualists consider legislative intent to be both nonexistent
and irrelevant, it was surprising (to say the least) that the West Virginia
majority defended the major questions doctrine on the grounds that it
purportedly reflects “a practical understanding of legislative intent.” And
given that textualists typically downplay legislative history, it was even
more surprising that the West Virginia majority relied on legislative
history—the statement of a single Senator—to conclude that the statutory
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provision at issue was “obscure.” Those interpretive moves are the work of
legal pragmatism, not textualism.
The Congressional Review Act
Second, consider how the major question doctrine’s foundational
presumption (that Congress intends to decide major questions itself ) is in
tension with actual statutory text.
Textualists look to enacted statutory text in order to determine a statute’s
objectified intent—i.e., the intent an objective reader would take an
enacted text to have at the time the text was enacted. The major question
doctrine’s judge-made presumption that Congress intends to decide
major questions itself is in tension with the Congressional Review Act,
which demonstrates that Congress expects agencies (rather than
Congress) to decide major questions.
Specifically, the Congressional Review Act demonstrates a congressional
expectation that administrative agencies will answer major questions
through “major rules” (a statutorily defined term that considers political
and economic majorness, similar to the major questions doctrine’s
definition of majorness). Moreover, the Act mandates that “major rules”
must be given legal effect unless Congress enacts new legislation stating
otherwise.
Thus, it took special legislation in 2001 for Congress to withhold legal
effect from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s
(“OSHA’s”) major rule concerning ergonomics. By comparison, in 2022,
Congress did not pass special legislation to withhold legal effect from
OSHA’s major rule concerning COVID-19 vaccinations. And yet, the
Supreme Court invoked the major questions doctrine to withhold legal
effect from OSHA’s 2022 rule because the Court considered that rule to
answer a matter of “vast economic and political significance”—in effect,
the Court concluded that the major questions doctrine purportedly
empowered it to do what Congress would not.
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In short, the major questions doctrine is in tension with actual statutory
text—a centerpiece of textualist interpretation—because it replaces the
Congressional
framework

Review

with

the

Act’s

major-rules-are-valid-unless-rejected

judge-made

major-rules-are-invalid-unless-

approved framework.
Active Liberty
Finally, Justice Gorsuch’s defense of the major questions doctrine, offered
in his concurring opinion in West Virginia, further demonstrates that the
doctrine is the work of legal pragmatism, not textualism.
According to Justice Gorsuch, major political questions should be
answered by “elected representatives,” not unelected bureaucrats, in part
because “the framers believed that a republic—a thing of the people—
would be more likely to enact just laws.” Thus, the framers required a
congressional lawmaking process that secures several “ends,” including
that national policy obtain “broad consensus” and “wide social
acceptance.” The major questions doctrine, in his view, promotes those
and similar “ends” by ensuring that major decisions are made by
Congress, not agencies.
It is difficult to distinguish Justice Gorsuch’s interpretive focus on
democratic “ends” from Justice Breyer’s pragmatic focus on “active
liberty,” the latter of which maintains that “the Constitution’s democratic
objective” should serve as “an interpretive aid.” To be sure, textualism
promotes democracy. But textualists promote democracy by applying

specific Constitutional provisions that promote democracy in the specific
ways written-out in the Constitution. Put differently, textualists
understand themselves bound to the Constitution’s chosen means of
promoting democracy—not other means that a judge might think up
(such as the major questions doctrine).
As one leading textualist scholar, Harvard Law Dean John Manning,
explained: “constitutional values do not … exist in the abstract,” instead,
“constitutional values … find concrete expression in many discrete
constitutional provisions, which prescribe the means of implementing
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the value in question.” That text-focused approach is in conflict with
Justice Breyer’s focus on “active liberty,” pursuant to which “the
Constitution’s

general

democratic

objective”

can

“influence

the

interpretation” of specific constitutional provisions”—even provisions
that do not themselves address the Constitution’s democratic objective
“directly.”
A textualist analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions reveals that
the major questions doctrine undermines, rather than promotes, the
Constitution’s chosen means for promoting democracy.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution outlines the exclusive means of
enacting federal statutes. That provision requires a specific democratic
process: both the House and Senate must approve statutory text that is
then presented to the President for approval or veto. Throughout that
democratic process, any federal legislator or the President may negotiate
for different statutory language—including when the legislator or
President thinks different language would better address topics that the
legislator or President thinks to be of major political importance. But
Article I, Section 7 does not permit the federal judiciary to similarly
exercise political judgment as a participant in the lawmaking process.
Instead, federal courts merely exercise legal (not political) judgment by
interpreting the final statutory language that survives the Article I,
Section 7 lawmaking process. The major questions doctrine—which
permits unelected judges to withhold legal effect from a law due to
political calculations of majorness, similar to what an elected President
might do when exercising the veto power or an elected legislator might do
when considering a bill—runs afoul of the Constitution’s exclusive means
(Article I, Section 7) for democratic lawmaking.
For textualists concerned with reigning in the administrative state, the
major questions doctrine might seem like a step in the right direction.
After all, the Supreme Court has been loath to enforce the nondelegation
doctrine in recent decades, and sometimes enforcing the Constitution’s
limitations on delegations of congressional authority is better than never
enforcing those limitations at all. But invoking the major questions
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doctrine is the wrong way to enforce nondelegation concerns because
invoking the major questions doctrine (and its focus on political
calculations) comes at the cost of undermining textualism (and its
separation of legal and policy considerations) more generally. Textualists
would thus do best by rejecting the major questions doctrine and instead
applying the Constitution’s limitations on delegations across the board—
not just in those instances that a judge thinks to be of particular political
importance.

Chad Squitieri is an assistant professor of law at the Catholic University of
America, where he serves as a fellow within the Project for Constitutional
Originalism and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition.
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